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Abstract 
This study analyzes the impacts of different announcements of the Qualified Mortgage 
GSE Patch expiration, set for January 10, 2021. The Qualified Mortgage GSE Patch was 
introduced in January 2014 to allow for the GSEs, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, to 
originate loans above the monthly Debt-to-Income ratio of 43 percent with the same 
protections as a Qualified Mortgage. To analyze these impacts, I measure the changes in 
the number of loans the GSEs obtain and weighted average home price before the 
announcement to after the announcement. In order to test for significance, I use a five-
year benchmark period to compare against these announcement periods, conducting 
Student t-tests and difference in differences tests. The results of this study show that there 
were some significant positive changes in home price after an announcement period; 
however, there were no significant positive changes in the number of GSE loans. The 
results highlight that although both loan count and home prices were increasing in the 
announcement periods, there is a lack of significance in the short-term announcement 
periods.  
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Introduction 
This paper examines how multiple announcements of the expiration of the 
qualified mortgage GSE patch (“QM GSE Patch”) have affected the residential real estate 
market of the United States. The qualified mortgage patch has allowed for the 
government-sponsored enterprises, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, to purchase loans that 
exceed the 43 percent monthly Debt-to-Income (“DTI”) ratio established for a qualified 
mortgage loan. This ruling by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) has 
caused for a lot of discussion regarding what will happen to the residential real estate 
market after this expiration.  
There has been plenty of literature and research conducted on the impact of the 
Qualified Mortgage Patch on the housing market over the last five years, as well as 
research on what will happen when it expires in January 2021. Most of the research and 
literature focusing on the expiration is about the long-term impact of it, rather than the 
short-term, current-day impact. This paper contributes to the understanding of current-
day impacts of the announcement to let the patch expire through an event-date study. 
Through this study, I look at changes in the number of loans that Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae originate or purchase surrounding two different announcement dates as well as the 
change in weighted average home price. 
In order to identify these housing market reactions, I use Recursion Co.’s Cohort 
Analyzer, a loan level querying tool that pulls monthly data from all GSE loans that have 
been originated since 1990. I use their data to identify the changes to loan count and 
home price for a month prior to an announcement date and a month after to measure any 
reaction from the market. Also, I look at the full period from the first announcement date 
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up until the most recently published data (October 2019) to see if there are actual 
announcement reactions or if it’s just a market trend. 
I expect to see immediately following these announcement periods that there will 
be an increase in the number of loans the GSEs obtain over the DTI cap as well as an 
increase in the weighted average home price in reaction to the announcement of the 
expiration of the QM GSE Patch. As the GSEs will no longer be the only ones able to 
obtain these non-QM, over the 43 percent DTI cap, with the current protections laid out 
for them by the patch (Kaul et al., 2018), I expect to see them increase their loan count in 
this field before other firms are allowed to enter this non-QM market.  The view that 
weighted average home prices will increase is based upon research done by Pinto et al. 
(2019) that shows higher increases in home price appreciation for borrowers over the DTI 
cap of 43 percent. Pinto et al. (2019) also explain that with looser lending standards, such 
as lending above the DTI cap, when there’s already a shortage of housing, it tends to lead 
to higher prices. With this information, I expect to see a continuous trend in upward 
home prices, especially immediately following these announcement periods.  
In order to obtain my results, I used a Student t-test and a differences in 
differences test against a five year benchmark period outside of the date ranges I test. 
This shows whether or not the changes in loan count and changes in weighted average 
home price during these two announcement periods, as well as during the eight month 
potential trend period, were statistically significant against the benchmark rates. The first 
date in the study is March 27, 2019, when President Donald Trump released a 
presidential memoranda regarding housing finance reform, which included his support 
for allowing the patch to expire. The second date in the study is July 25, 2019, where the 
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau formally announced their plan to allow the QM 
Patch to expire. The results from the first announcement period show that there were 
increases in both loan count and weighted average home price; however, when 
comparing against the benchmark, there were no statistically significant results. The 
second announcement period shows that the increase in loan count was not significant, 
but the change in the weighted average home prices were predominantly significant. 
When looking to see if there was a continuous upward trend in the eight month period 
from first announcement date to October, it can be seen that the increases in loan count 
and weighted average home price were also insignificant against the benchmark period, 
showing that there is no significant trend in the results.  
In regard to the broader literature surrounding the QM Patch, my findings provide 
information regarding the short-term effects of these announcements. Prior to this study, 
there was no literature regarding the short-term effects of these announcements, but 
instead literature on what have been the effects of QM since its establishment and the 
future of QM post-expiration in 2021. I am the first to contribute to announcement date 
studies for the QM Patch and have shown that these announcements have had no 
significant impact on the short-term housing market. Along with this, my results 
contribute to the existing knowledge that the QM Patch has contributed to a rise in home 
prices across the country, and that an expiration of the patch could put downward 
pressure on home prices.  
Institutional Background and Literature Review 
After the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, there were numerous pieces of financial 
reform legislation passed, one of which was the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
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Consumer Protection Act. Passed in 2010 as a response to the impacts of the Global 
Financial Crisis in the United States, it included the establishment of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”). According to this act, the establishment of the 
CFPB was to protect consumers from “unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices” (CFPB 
2019) and increase consumer knowledge of the loans they sign up for. In order to protect 
consumers further against predatory mortgage lending, the CFPB established the 
qualified mortgage rule (“QM Rule”) in January of 2014.   
The QM rule was designed by the CFPB in order to protect consumers from loans 
that they could not afford (Kaul and Goodman, 2018). There are mandatory requirements 
that have to be fulfilled in order for a mortgage loan to meet the definition of a qualified 
mortgage. They are as follows: The loan cannot have negative amortization, interest-only 
payments, or balloon payments; Total fees cannot exceed 3 percent of the loan amount; 
the mortgage term cannot exceed 30 years. Along with these requirements, a borrower’s 
total monthly debt-to-income ratio must typically be 43 percent or less. However, this is 
not necessarily the case with the CFPB establishing the qualified mortgage government 
sponsored enterprise patch. This QM GSE Patch allows for mortgage loans to be 
purchased or originated over the DTI cap of 43 percent as long as they are able to be 
purchased by either Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae. This has given both Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae a clear advantage in the real estate market, which has helped them secure a 
large market share of originations. As of the end of 1H 2019, GSE market share was 40.2 
percent, which has been increasing tremendously under the patch (Urban Institute, 2019).  
Along with their large market share, without this patch, approximately 19 percent of the 
loans originated by the GSE’s since 2014 wouldn’t have been possible (Goodman, 2019), 
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as well as 16 percent of all loans originated in 2018 (Carroll, 2019). This patch, 
established along with the QM rule, is set to expire on January 10, 2021, or the day the 
GSEs exit the Federal Housing Finance Agency conservatorship, whichever comes first 
(Kaul and Goodman, 2018). However, the CFPB announced on July 25th, 2019 that they 
plan to let the QM GSE Patch to expire in 2021. With that announcement, there are lots 
of questions as to how this will impact the housing market today and in the long-run, as 
well as what a potential new QM rule could look like.  
 
Since the beginning of 2019, there have been a multitude of articles and papers 
published on the idea of allowing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)’s 
Qualified Mortgage (“QM”) Patch to expire in January 2021. There is literature that is 
both for and against the expiration of the patch, as well as literature as to how the market 
should react following the announcement of the expiration. Pinto (2019) has reviewed the 
expiration of the QM Patch, where he identifies that since the ruling was implemented in 
2014, it was a major cause for housing prices to boom in the time period from then until 
2019. Along with Peter (2019), the two have looked at home price appreciation and how 
GSE-sponsored loans above the 43 percent Debt-to-Income (DTI) cap have performed. 
Their research shows that home prices with the insertion of the QM Patch have increased, 
especially at lower price segments. Pinto (2019) also provides evidence that with the 
bureau’s announcement of letting the GSE QM Patch expire, the market will adjust prices 
lower with the expiration of the patch. This is due to an increase in credit standards, 
which would reduce the demand for homes, especially starter homes, leading to a 
reduction in home prices (Pinto, 2019). Along with the pricing adjustment, Pinto (2019) 
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also explains that the earlier the announcement of the plan to let the QM Patch expire, the 
better off lenders and other market participants will be once it actually expires and the 
market opens back up to the public.  
Along with this research done by Pinto (2018) and Peter, Kaul, and Goodman 
(2018), have shown that with the rising prices of homes from 2014 when the patch was 
established through 2018, the number of GSE loans originated over the DTI cap have 
increased extraordinarily over the amount of non-GSE loans originated that meet the QM 
requirements. Pinto (2018) would argue as well that because of the number of loans 
originated over the 43 percent cap, this causes for the GSEs to have too much power in 
the mortgage industry and has led to an un-level playing field. In addition to the research 
done by Kaul et al. (2018), Carroll (2019) examines the effects of loans originated over 
the 43 percent cap, as well as how the removal of the patch would impact those of low-
income backgrounds, along with people from different ethnic/demographic backgrounds 
and how that can impact the housing market as well. Carroll (2019) writes that about 16 
percent of the loans originated in 2018 (roughly $260 Billion) wouldn’t have been 
originated as QM eligible if it weren’t for the patch, showing how large an impact an 
expiration would be on those in need of the QM GSE Patch. He also adds that most of the 
people in this group of above the 43 percent cap are “younger millennials and retirees, 
Non-W-2 borrowers, low-income borrowers, and borrowers purchasing low-to-mid 
priced homes” (Carroll, 2019). Carroll (2019) shows in his research that these groups will 
be non-QM eligible with the expiration of the QM GSE Patch in 2021, meaning that 
people living in low-income and minority neighborhoods will be less likely to obtain a 
mortgage loan.  
12 
 
In their research of mortgage regulation, Bubb and Krishnamurthy (2019) provide 
evidence that underneath the current QM Patch regulation, we could continue to see an 
upward pressure on housing prices that could potentially cause for another housing 
bubble. The evidence shows that a continuation of allowing this patch to continue could 
contribute to another financial crisis, because as seen before, with asset appreciation from 
relaxed financial regulation, it can be a cause for unsafe housing bubbles, which can 
result in recession when they bust. Along with Bubb et al., McCoy and Wachter (2019), 
provide evidence in their research that shows that QM ruling is necessary in order to 
prevent poorly written mortgages and loans from causing another housing bubble, which 
may lead to a financial crisis. The QM Patch, being an exception to that rule, will fuel a 
bubble in housing prices according to the authors. 
In their review of the planned expiration of the QM patch, Karayjan et al. (2019) 
of Kroll Bond Rating Agency (KBRA) explains how the private open market will be 
ready for this transition at the beginning of 2021. They believe that there will be no 
shortage of lenders willing to join both the QM and non-QM Market (loans that are above 
the 43 percent DTI cap and loans that don’t meet Appendix Q requirements), as long as 
the QM definition remains stable. Karayjan et al. (2019) suggest that a lot of investors 
will be attracted to the high returns of the non-QM Along with Karayjan et al., Lane 
(2019) shows that there have already been financial groups joining the housing market 
once again, as PIMCO has bought loans originated by Capital One. However, there is 
evidence that also suggests that there won’t be a shortage of lenders, regardless if these 
mortgages meet the definition of a QM. According to Finkelstein (2019), Non-QM 
issuance has grown ever since the QM Patch was established, and along with that growth, 
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there is a larger demand for the product than ever before. With this literature, it suggests 
that there will be plenty of opportunities in the open market come 2021 when the patch 
expires.  
In preparation for the eventual expiration of the QM Patch, I expect to see both 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac increase the number of originated loans above the current 
cap of 43 percent DTI. Knowing that there will be competition from other investors to 
obtain these loans after January 10, 2021, they will securitize more of these loans above 
the DTI cap now in order to maintain their large market share. As Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac continue to secure more of these loans, I’d expect the number of loans 
originating over the cap to increase as well, knowing that the GSE’s still have that sole 
ability to obtain loans over the cap. Although we tend to see a rise in the number of loans 
originated over the DTI cap before the announcement (Pinto, 2018), I believe that we will 
see a larger reaction to these announcements than we have seen over last few years. 
Along with an increase in the number of loans above the DTI cap, I also expect to 
see housing prices across the country to rise in reaction to the announcement of the 
expiration. As the GSEs utilize this patch to their advantage in the short term, the demand 
for these loans above the cap will increase, driving up home prices in the short-term. Due 
to the GSEs ability to cross-subsidize, borrowers that are above the DTI cap of 43 percent 
now will have a higher demand to purchase homes now with either Freddie Mac or 
Fannie Mae because of the lower rate they’ll receive (Karayjan et al., 2019). Once private 
investors are introduced into the market with the expiration of the patch, they’ll charge at 
higher rates since those above the DTI cap are inherently riskier. As the demand for these 
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low GSE cross-subsidized rates increase, the demand to purchase a home in the short 
term will increase, which would lead to an increase in price. With evidence from Pinto 
(2019), there is already an increase in all home prices since the establishment of this QM 
Patch; however, similar to the reaction to number of loans increasing, I expect to see a 
sharper rise in home prices for those that are above the DTI cap. However, in the long 
term, I do expect that after the expiration of the QM Patch, there will be a depreciation in 
home price. As Pinto (2019) writes, the upward pressure that the QM Patch has brought 
to home prices will be relieved with the expiration, with prices to fall shortly. Other 
evidence from Karayjan et al. (2019) suggests that by reducing borrower leverage, prices 
across the housing market will also decrease in the long term.  
Research Design 
In order to look at the effects of the announcement of the QM GSE Patch 
expiration in 2021, I take a look at different possible event days where I could possibly 
see some change in the housing market. One of these dates is March 27, 2019, where a 
Presidential Memoranda was released regarding Federal Housing Finance Reform. In this 
memoranda, Donald Trump announced that he would be working with the Secretary of 
Housing and Urban Development and the Director of the CFPB to see if the QM Patch 
should be allowed to expire in January 2021 (Trump, 2019).  The other event day is the 
actual announcement from the CFPB that says it plans to let the patch expire in 2021, 
which occurred on July 25, 2019.  
These two dates appear to be the most influential dates in which there were 
announcements made about the expiration of the QM Patch. According to Bodie et al. 
(2014), market prices should reflect all currently available information, so the addition of 
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new information to the market, such as these announcements, should also be reflected in 
market prices (2014). Using the announcement date theory suggested by Bodie et al. 
(2014), I would be able to see a change in the market prices of homes after the 
announcement was made that the CFPB would allow for the QM GSE Patch to expire.  
Due to the housing market being heavily regulated and loan originations taking a 
longer period of time than most other market transactions, I look at the month before and 
the month after the announcement in order to get a more accurate representation of this 
market. This is due to the fact that the average amount of time it takes to get a mortgage 
is about 30 days. Along with this, Guntermann et al. (1991) suggest that the real estate 
market is less efficient than most financial markets, so I most likely wouldn’t see a large 
change overnight. Giving a window of 30 days prior to announcement day as well as 30 
days after gives me a better chance of seeing the real estate market reacting to the 
announcement.  
In order to measure the impacts that these announcements had on the housing 
market, I look at a multitude of different factors. First, I look at the number of loans that 
were originated 30 days before and 30 days after the announcement date, breaking it 
down by different “buckets” of debt-to-income (“DTI”) ratios. I look at loans originating 
at DTI less than or equal to 41 percent, 42 percent, at the 43 percent cap, 44 percent, 45 
percent, and greater than 45 percent. This way, I was able to see the effects of this 
announcement on groups that are way above or below the cap, as well as those right 
around the DTI cap. I expect to see the number of loans above this 43 percent DTI cap to 
increase following each of the announcement dates that I measure, relative to those that 
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are below the cap. After measuring the number of loans that are originated at each of 
these levels of DTI, I measure how this announcement affects house prices for each of 
these DTI buckets. Using LTV and the original loan amount, I’m able to calculate the 
price of the home in order to see how housing prices react to the announcements of the 
QM Patch expiration. Along with measuring these specific outcomes, I look at other 
possible factors that could affect these results or give me more information on what 
groups of people might be in these different DTI buckets. These factors include 
measurements such as original LTV, original loan amount, and FICO Score. The FICO 
Score is used as an indicator for willingness to pay, based upon prior credit history 
whereas DTI is focused more about a consumer’s ability to pay because it reflects their 
current leverage or free cash flow. The FICO Score  is a rank ordering tool to predict the 
likelihood of a consumer going 90-plus days past due over the next 24 months, with a 
lower score relating to a bad payer and a higher score relating to a good payer. All of 
FICO’s data comes from the three major credit bureaus:  Experian, Equifax, and 
TransUnion. The data they use does not include demographics or other prohibited factors. 
(FICO).  
In order to calculate all of the data points I mention above, I use the Recursion 
Cohort Analyzer, which is an agency mortgage querying tool that allows access to all 
GSE loans at a loan level basis. This database contains all of the data that I need in order 
to test how many loans were originated in each time period for each different DTI bucket 
in the tables below. Along with this, I calculate the weighted average home price for each 
of these different DTI buckets. Through these measurements, I’m able to determine the 
percent change in each of these variables after the announcement date occurs. Along with 
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looking at these different DTI buckets, I also use loans from the GSEs that are either 
below or at the DTI cap of 43 percent or above the 43 percent cap.  
To determine whether these loans are significantly changing along these event 
days, I create a dataset that includes five years of GSE loans prior to the event dates. I use 
data from January 2014 until January 2019, which is also five years of data in which the 
QM GSE Patch was established. This benchmark consists of the mean percent change in 
loan count on a monthly basis over the five-year span, as well as the mean percent change 
in weighted average home price on a monthly basis. With this information, I’m able to 
calculate the variation in these results in order to determine statistical significance for my 
event dates to see if there is a true reaction to the different announcements of the QM 
GSE Patch expiration.  
Along with analyzing the reactions to loan count and home price around these 
event dates, I also look at the market for these loans from the first announcement date up 
until the latest data published by Recursion. This way, I can properly determine if there is 
a true market reaction within those 30 days after the announcements, or if this is just a 
continuous trend in the market from the first announcement to today.  
To determine if the differences in the means of percent change of loans or percent 
change of weighted average home prices, I use a Student’s t-test. In this test, I use the 
five-year benchmark rates that I calculate at each of the DTI “buckets” as well as the 
rates for below/at the cap and above the cap. I use the t-test for both of the event dates to 
test for significance in reaction to the announcements as well by subtracting the mean 
percent change in loan count or home price against the benchmark mean, divided by the 
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standard deviation of the benchmark means. Along with the two event days, I use the 
same t-tests to determine if the eight-month span between the first announcement and the 
last published data is a trend or not. For the t-test, since it is monthly reported data, I have 
60 data points for the five-year benchmark, so I use 59 as my degrees of freedom and a 
significance level of α=.05, leading to a t-statistic of about 2. For the eight-month trend, I 
use the following formula to test for significance in results at each DTI bucket:  
  𝑡𝑡 =
8 × (𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 % −  𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷  %)
√8  × 𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 %
 
Here, 𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷  percent represents the mean percent change at the certain DTI bucket I test, 
whereas 𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷  percent is representative of the five-year benchmark mean percent change at 
the certain DTI level. 𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 percent is the five-year benchmark standard deviation at the 
DTI level I am testing. Since this testing is over an eight-month period, I take this into 
account by multiplying the standard deviation by the square root of eight since there are 
eight observations. I multiply the numerator by eight as well because the return over the 
period is eight times larger than a single month return.  
Along with the Student’s t-test, I also conduct a difference in differences test to 
determine if the mean percent change in loan count above the DTI cap increases at a 
higher rate than the mean percent change in loan count below or at the DTI cap. I use the 
same test for the percent change in weighted average home price. The formula I use is the 
following:                  
𝑡𝑡 = ((𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏 𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) − (𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏 𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎))/(𝜎𝜎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏 𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) 
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Here, 𝑟𝑟 is representative of the rate of the time period I’m testing, whereas 𝑟𝑟 represents 
the benchmark rate from the five-year period. 𝜎𝜎 is the standard deviation of the 
benchmark rate difference in means of above the DTI cap and below or at the DTI cap.  
Results 
In order to test for the significance in the changes in percent change in loan count 
as well as the change in weighted average home price, I use a five-year benchmark prior 
to the event dates as my control. Tables 1 and 2 below shows the results of the five-year 
time period (January 2014 through January 2019) prior to event dates, which includes the 
data required for the Student t-tests and the difference in differences tests that I run. Table 
1 shows the results of the loan count changes for the GSEs over the five-year period and 
Table 2 shows the results of the weighted average home price changes for GSE loans 
over the same period. Both tables show loan information for the different DTI buckets 
that I test, from less than or equal to 41 percent DTI to greater than 45 percent.  
TABLE 1 
DTI ( 
percent) 
Mean Change Variance  Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error 
FICO 
≤ 41 0.9537 % 1.59320E-05 0.003991494 0.00051965 754.73 
42 1.4229 % 3.07458E-05 0.005544888 0.00072188 743.55 
43 1.4808 % 3.48690E-05 0.005905002 0.00076877 742.30 
44 1.5131 % 4.03432E-05 0.00635163 0.00082691 740.43 
45 1.5347 % 2.97341E-05 0.005452898 0.00070991 738.25 
> 45 0.9898 % 4.64007E-05 0.006811804 0.00088682 739.36 
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TABLE 2 
DTI ( 
percent) 
Mean Change Variance Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error 
FICO 
≤ 41 0.0820 % 6.22438E-07 0.000788948 0.00010271 754.73 
42 0.0652 % 5.02179E-07 0.000708646 0.00009226 743.55 
43 0.0625 % 3.83975E-07 0.000619657 0.00008067 742.30 
44 0.0546 % 3.39345E-07 0.000582533 0.00007584 740.43 
45 0.0833 % 2.44901E-07 0.000494874 0.00006443 738.25 
> 45 -0.3137 % 1.42218E-06 0.001192551 0.00015526 739.36 
 
From Table 1, it can be seen that over the five-year benchmark period, we do see a 
continuous trend in growth in the number of GSE loans, with all percent changes in the 
mean at each bucket being above zero. Table 2 presents the data on weighted average 
home price changes over the benchmark period. As shown above, there seems to be very 
miniscule changes to weighted average home price amongst the different DTI levels that 
I test for. There is still an increase in weighted average home price at most levels of DTI; 
however, at the greater than 45 percent DTI level, there is a more significant decrease in 
home price, decreasing by -.3137 percent on average over the five-year period.  
 Tables 3 and 4 show the data on the same information as tables 1 and 2, but 
instead of breaking it down by individual DTI levels, it is broken into the two groups of 
below or at the DTI cap or above the DTI cap. In addition to the two groups, I add the 
group of above the DTI cap minus below or at the DTI cap for my difference in 
differences calculations. Table 3 shows the results from the five-year benchmark in 
regards to average percent change in loan count and Table 4 shows the results regarding 
the average percent change in weighted average home price.  
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TABLE 3 
DTI Mean Change Variance Standard 
Deviation 
Standard Error FICO 
Below/At 0.9951 % 1.67626E-05 0.004094220 0.00052856 753.6357 
Above 1.1942 % 7.18619E-06 0.002680707 0.00034608 739.2733 
Above-
Below 
0.1991 % 2.7658E-05 0.005259084 0.00068467 -14.3625 
 
TABLE 4 
DTI Mean Change Variance Standard 
Deviation 
Standard Error FICO 
Below/At 0.0821 % 5.84158E-07 0.000764302 9.95037E-05 753.6357 
Above 0.2172 % 4.89414E-07 0.000699582 9.10778E-05 739.2733 
Above-
Below 
0.1351 % 1.99053E-07 0.000446154 5.80843E-05 -14.3625 
 
Table 3 provides data on the mean percent change in loan count along with the variance, 
standard deviation, and standard error for the benchmark period. The results here show 
that over the benchmark period, the mean percent change in the number of loans greater 
than the DTI cap of 43 percent is larger than the mean percent change in the number of 
loans below or at the DTI cap by .1991 percent. Table 4 presents data on the weighted 
average home price change below or at the DTI cap and above the cap. In this table, it 
shows that there was an increase in weighted average home price above and below the 
cap. Similar to Table 3, the increase in home prices above the DTI cap is greater than the 
changes that are seen below or at the cap.  
Event Date 1: March 27, 2019 
 To test for the significance of the results of the first event date, President Trump’s 
Memoranda on Housing Reform, I calculated the mean percent change in loan count and 
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weighted average home price for the month prior to the event and the month after the 
event. These calculations allow me to run the Student t-tests and the difference in 
differences test for this event date. Table 5 shows the results of the loan count changes 
for the GSEs over the event date period and table 6 shows the results for weighted 
average home price changes for GSE loans over the same period.  
TABLE 5 
Below/At 
DTI % Change Around 
Event Date 
% Change During Benchmark 
Period 
Difference in 
means event vs. 
benchmark  
Mean FICO Mean Standard 
Deviation 
FICO t-statistic 
≤ 41 0.3845% 753.01 0.9537% 0.003991 754.73 -1.4261422 
42 0.6420% 741.83 1.4229% 0.005545 743.55 -1.4083323 
43 0.6353% 740.64 1.4808% 0.005905 742.30 -1.4319214 
Avg. 
Below/at 
0.4083% 745.16 0.9951% 0.004094 753.64 -1.4332889 
Above 
DTI  % Change Around 
Event Date 
 % Change During Benchmark 
Period 
Difference in 
means event vs. 
benchmark 
 
Mean FICO Mean Standard 
Deviation 
FICO t-statistic 
44 0.6042% 738.51 1.5131% 0.006352 740.43 -1.4309578 
45 0.7464% 735.98 1.5347% 0.005453 738.25 -1.4456068 
> 45 1.0438% 740.00 0.9898% 0.006812 739.36 0.07921383 
Average 
Above 
0.8866% 738.16 1.1942% 0.002681 739.27 -1.1475852 
Difference in 
means 
Below/at vs. 
Above 
t-statistic 
0.530864452 
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TABLE 6 
Below/At 
DTI % Change Around 
Event Date 
% Change During Benchmark 
Period 
Difference in 
means event 
vs. 
benchmark 
 
Mean FICO Mean Standard 
Deviation 
FICO t-statistic 
≤ 41 0.1220% 753.01 0.0820% 0.000789 754.73 0.506059706 
42 0.1113% 741.83 0.0652% 0.000709 743.55 0.650297482 
43 0.1392% 740.64 0.0625% 0.00062 742.30 1.238358879 
Avg. Below/at 0.1242% 745.16 0.0821% 0.000764 753.64 0.550959157 
Above 
DTI % Change Around 
Event Date 
% Change During Benchmark 
Period 
Difference in 
means event 
vs. benchmark 
 
Mean FICO Mean Standard 
Deviation 
FICO t-statistic 
44 0.0860% 738.51 0.0546% 0.0005825 740.43 0.5394846 
45 0.1316% 735.98 0.0833% 0.0004949 738.25 0.9761467 
> 45 0.2269% 740.00 -
0.3137% 
0.0011926 739.36 4.5331618 
Average 
Above 
0.1489% 738.16 0.2172% 0.0006996 739.27 -0.975712 
Difference in 
means 
Below/at vs. 
Above 
t-statistic 
-2.473785 
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Table 5’s results show that after the event date, the mean change in loan count 
increases both below/at the DTI cap, as well as above the cap. Beyond that, it also shows 
that at each of the DTI buckets, loan counts are increasing.  These results also show that 
the mean loan count change above the DTI cap is larger than the change below or at the 
cap by about .4783 percent. Table 6 presents results of an increase in the mean change of 
weighted average home price from before the event date to after the event date at each of 
the DTI buckets. These changes are much smaller than those seen in Table 5 but are still 
all increasing after the March 27th event date.   
 I use these results from Tables 5 and 6 in order to determine if these mean percent 
changes over the event period are significant. Table 5 shows the results of the Student t-
tests and difference in differences test for the loan count changes over the first event 
period. Table 5 shows that at each of the DTI buckets, the t-statistic is less than the 
benchmark value of t=2. These results go against my hypothesis that the percent change 
in loans would increase above the cap at a significant amount. Along with the t-tests, the 
calculation for the difference in differences test of mean percent change above the DTI 
cap against the mean percent change below or at the cap shows non-significance, with a t-
value of .53086. Overall, the results from the first event date in regard to loan count are 
not aligned with my hypothesis.  
 Table 6 presents the results of the Student t-tests for the mean percent change for 
weighted average home price over the event period tested against the five-year 
benchmark, as well as the results from the difference in differences test. Above, the 
results from table 6 show that at the DTI buckets from less than or equal to 41 percent to 
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45 percent, the changes in home price from the month prior to the first event date to the 
month after the date are insignificant. However, at the greater than 45 percent DTI 
bucket, the changes are statistically significant, with a t-statistic of 4.533, greater than 2. 
This significant value at the greater than 45 percent DTI bucket is a result of the five-year 
benchmark mean percent change at that bucket decreasing while in the event period, 
mean percent change increased. In regard to the Student t-tests below and at the DTI cap 
and above the cap, neither of those results can be considered statistically significant. For 
the difference in differences test, the results show that it is technically significant; 
however, it is the opposite of my hypothesis. This shows that the rate at which weighted 
average home price increased above the DTI cap against those below or at the cap in the 
event period was less than the difference in the benchmark period. Like the results from 
table 5, the results from table 6 also do not align with my hypothesis, except at the greater 
than 45 percent DTI bucket for mean percent change in weighted average home price. 
The first event date study for March 27th, 2019 is mostly insignificant in support of my 
hypothesis of increases in the number of loans above the DTI cap and an increase in 
weighted average home price above the DTI cap. 
Event Date 2: July 25, 2019 
 Similar to my first event date, I once again calculated the mean percent change in 
loan count and weighted average home price for the month prior to the event and the 
month after the event to test for significance around the CFPB’s announcement to let the 
QM Patch expire in 2021. Table 7 shows the results for the mean percent change in loan 
count from the month prior to announcement day to the month after. This table shows 
that the loan count from the month prior to the announcement to the month after 
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increased at every DTI bucket, with a higher percentage change in those buckets greater 
than the DTI cap of 43 percent. The table also shows that there is an increase in mean 
change in the below or at the DTI cap group as well as the above the cap group, with a 
difference of about .3547 percent between the above group and the below or at group. 
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TABLE 7 
Below/At 
DTI % Change Around 
Event Date 
% Change During Benchmark 
Period 
Difference in 
means event 
vs. 
benchmark 
 
Mean FICO Mean Standard 
Deviation 
FICO t-statistic 
≤ 41 0.7632% 753.25 0.9537% 0.003991 754.73 -
0.477387777 
42 0.8639% 742.07 1.4229% 0.005545 743.55 -
1.008059899 
43 0.8456% 740.89 1.4808% 0.005905 742.30 -
1.075802406 
Avg. Below/at 0.7718% 745.40 0.9951% 0.004094 753.64 -
0.545396638 
Above 
DTI % Change Around 
Event Date 
% Change During Benchmark 
Period 
Difference in 
means event 
vs. benchmark  
Mean FICO Mean Standard 
Deviation 
FICO t-statistic 
44 0.8456% 738.74 1.5131% 0.0063516 740.43 -1.050916219 
45 0.9141% 736.22 1.5347% 0.0054529 738.25 -1.138148891 
> 45 1.3214% 741.32 0.9898% 0.0068118 739.36 0.486749865 
Average 
Above 
1.1265% 738.76 1.1942% 0.0026807 739.27 -0.252752011 
Difference in 
means 
Below/at vs. 
Above 
t-statistic 
0.2957587 
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TABLE 8 
Below/At 
DTI % Change Around 
Event Date 
% Change During Benchmark 
Period 
Difference in 
means event 
vs. 
benchmark 
 
Mean FICO Mean Standard 
Deviation 
FICO t-statistic 
≤ 41 0.4289% 753.25 0.0820% 0.000789 754.73 4.396889142 
42 0.2993% 742.07 0.0652% 0.000709 743.55 3.303138352 
43 0.2650% 740.89 0.0625% 0.00062 742.30 3.268711911 
Avg. Below/at 0.3300% 745.40 0.0821% 0.000764 753.64 3.243251468 
Above 
DTI % Change Around 
Event Date 
% Change During Benchmark 
Period 
Difference in 
means event 
vs. benchmark 
 
Mean FICO Mean Standard 
Deviation 
FICO t-statistic 
44 0.2650% 738.74 0.0546% 0.0005825 740.43 3.61293771 
45 0.2768% 736.22 0.0833% 0.0004949 738.25 3.91108165 
> 45 0.3555% 741.32 -
0.3137% 
0.0011926 739.36 5.61165382 
Average Above 0.2997% 738.76 0.2172% 0.0006996 739.27 1.17904614 
Difference in 
means 
Below/at vs. 
Above 
t-statistic 
-3.707206 
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Table 8 presents the data on the mean percent change in weighted average home 
price from the month prior to announcement date to month after. The results from this 
table show that there was an increase in weighted average home price after the CFPB’s 
announcement of their plan to let the QM Patch expire. At each different DTI bucket 
there was an evident increase, as well as in the two groups of below or at the DTI cap and 
above the DTI cap. However, it also shows that the weighted average home prices below 
or at the DTI cap increased more on average than those above the cap. 
 Using the results calculated in tables 7 and 8, I calculate whether or not these 
results can be considered statistically significant against the five-year benchmark. Table 
8shows the results from the Student t-tests for the different DTI buckets as well as the 
difference in differences test of mean percent change above the DTI cap versus below or 
at the cap. Table 7 results show that at each of the DTI buckets as well as the two below 
or at the cap and above the cap groups are insignificant according to the Student’s t-test, 
as all of the t-statistics calculated are below the t-statistic of 2. Along with the Student t-
tests, the difference in differences test also shows to be insignificant as the rise in mean 
percent change in loan count during the event period was not as great as the rise during 
the five-year benchmark.  
 Table 8 presents the results from the t-tests and difference in differences test for 
the mean percent change in weighted average home prices during the second event 
period. I calculate the t-statistics for each of the DTI buckets and the two groups of above 
the DTI cap and below or at the cap. The results from Table 8 show that at each of the 
DTI buckets that there is a significant change in the mean percent change of weighted 
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average home prices against the benchmark changes. This portion aligns with my 
hypothesis that there would be a significant change in reaction to the CFPB’s 
announcement to let the QM Patch expire. However, when I run a t-test for the entire 
group that is above the DTI cap of 43 percent, it becomes insignificant against the 
benchmark. For the difference in differences test, the result that I calculate shows that it 
is significant; however, this result is the opposite of what my hypothesis is for the change 
in home prices. This result of a t-statistic of -3.7072 shows that the mean percent change 
in weighted average home prices below or at the cap increased at a higher percent in the 
event day period than those above.  
 The second event date of July 25th, 2019 shows some significance in regard to an 
increase in weighted average home price in the event window after the announcement. 
However, the difference in differences test for weighted average home price reacts in a 
different manner than I expect, where there is a negative, significant t-statistic. For the 
mean percent change in the number of GSE loans, there are no significant results aligning 
with my hypothesis. 
Eight Month Trend:  
 To determine whether there were actual reactions or not to these different 
announcement dates, I use GSE loan data for an eight-month period, stretching from the 
first announcement period in February up until October 2019, which is the latest 
published GSE loan data. From this data, I calculate the mean percent change in loan 
count over the eight-month period for each DTI bucket as well as the mean percent 
change in weighted average home price. Table 9 shows the results of the calculations on 
mean percent change in loan count over the eight-month period.  
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TABLE 9 
Below/At 
DTI % Change Around Trend Period % Change During Benchmark 
Period 
Difference in 
means event 
vs. 
benchmark 
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
FICO Mean Standard 
Deviation 
FICO t-statistic 
≤ 41 0.4690% 0.0013189 753.15 0.9537% 0.003991 754.73 -10.3948994 
42 0.6429% 0.0015206 741.97 1.4229% 0.005545 743.55 -14.5077986 
43 0.6315% 0.0013821 740.78 1.4808% 0.005905 742.30 -17.3804664 
Avg. 
Below/at 
0.4847% 0.0012931 751.91 0.9951% 0.004094 753.64 -3.52617496 
Above 
DTI % Change Around Trend Period % Change During Benchmark 
Period 
Difference in 
means event 
vs. 
benchmark  
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
FICO Mean Standard 
Deviation 
FICO t-statistic 
44 0.6092% 0.001322 738.64 1.5131% 0.0063516 740.43 -19.341728 
45 0.7324% 0.001445 736.12 1.5347% 0.0054529 738.25 -15.701914 
> 45 1.0758% 0.002082 740.65 0.9898% 0.0068118 739.36 1.1680496 
Average 
Above 
0.9043% 0.001722 739.28 1.1942% 0.0026807 739.27 -4.7616915 
Difference 
in means 
Below/at 
vs. Above 
t-statistic 
0.41920013 
 
Table 9 shows that the mean percent change in loan count was increasing across each 
DTI bucket during the eight-month trend period. Table 9 also shows that over the eight-
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month period, there was a larger rise in the mean percent change of loan count for those 
above the DTI cap (.9043 percent) than those below or at the cap (.4847 percent).  
TABLE 10 
Below/At 
DTI % Change Around Trend Period % Change During Benchmark 
Period 
Difference in 
means event 
vs. 
benchmark 
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
FICO Mean Standard 
Deviation 
FICO t-statistic 
≤ 41 0.2203% 0.0012353 753.14574 0.0820% 0.000789 754.73 4.955633989 
42 0.1727% 0.0007942 741.96738 0.0652% 0.000709 743.55 4.286931144 
43 0.1594% 0.0007261 740.77979 0.0625% 0.00062 742.30 4.422846002 
Avg. 
Below/at 
0.2146% 0.0011749 751.91108 0.0821% 0.000764 753.64 4.905110626 
Above 
DTI % Change Around Trend Period % Change During Benchmark 
Period 
Difference in 
means event vs. 
benchmark 
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
FICO Mean Standard 
Deviation 
FICO t-statistic 
44 0.1430% 0.00087 738.64 0.0546% 0.0005825 740.43 4.29642054 
45 0.1635% 0.000762 736.12 0.0833% 0.0004949 738.25 4.58895114 
> 45 0.2402% 0.00159 740.65 -
0.3137% 
0.0011926 739.36 13.138025 
Average 
Above 
0.2079% 0.001226 739.28 0.2172% 0.0006996 739.27 -0.377889 
Difference in 
means 
Below/at vs. 
Above 
t-statistic 
-3.1803668 
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Table 10 presents the data on weighted average home prices for the same eight-month 
period. From this table, it can be seen that there is an increase in mean percent change of 
weighted average home prices during the trend period, with the largest increases coming 
from the DTI buckets less than or equal to 41 percent (.2203 percent) and greater than 45 
percent (.2402 percent). Also, there is an increase at both the groups of below or at the 
DTI cap and above the cap, with a larger increase in the group below or at the cap by less 
than .01 percent.  
Using results from Tables 9 and 10, I then run Student t-tests for each of the DTI 
buckets, as well as a difference in differences test for the mean percent change above the 
DTI cap minus the mean percent change below or at the cap. In Table 9, I present the 
results of these tests for the changes in loan count data over the eight-month period 
against the five year benchmark results using the formulas from the methodology section 
of this paper. 
The results show that over the eight-month trend period, the mean percent loan 
count change for almost each of the DTI buckets is significant; however, these significant 
results are not in support of my hypothesis as these show that the mean percent change in 
loan count over the period was significantly less than those changes during the five-year 
benchmark period. Only in the DTI bucket of greater than 45 percent DTI was there a 
positive t-value, but the result is still insignificant. The difference in differences test also 
comes out to be an insignificant result, with a t-value of .4192.  
 Table 10 presents the results from the t-tests on the mean percent change of 
weighted average home price over the eight-month period against the benchmark period. 
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It also includes the results from the difference in differences test for mean percent change 
above the DTI cap minus the mean percent change below or at the DTI cap for the eight-
month period. The results from Table 10 show that there is a significant trend over the 
eight-month period in mean percent change of weighted average home prices. At each of 
the DTI buckets from less than or equal to 41 percent to greater than 45 percent, there is a 
positive, significant t-value that shows there was a significant increase in the weighted 
average home price from the first announcement date to the latest published GSE loan 
data. When looking just at the group that is below or at the DTI cap, there is still a 
significant increase in weighted average home price over the eight-month trend period; 
however, when isolating the loans that are above the cap, the t-value for that group is 
insignificant, not aligning with my hypothesis. The difference in differences test for the 
mean percent change in weighted average home price above the DTI cap versus the mean 
percent change below or at the DTI cap is significant as well but goes directly against my 
hypothesis. This result shows that the change in weighted average home price below or at 
the 43 percent DTI cap increased at a higher rate than those above the DTI cap. 
 The eight-month trend period shows that there were increases in the mean percent 
change of GSE loans as well as in mean percent change of weighted average home prices. 
However, in regard to my hypothesis, the changes for mean percent loan count had 
negative t-value, which does not support my expectations. The mean percent change in 
loan count for the GSEs showed they were not increasing as much as they were during 
the five-year benchmark period. In regard to mean percent change in weighted average 
home price, there is significance when looking at individual DTI buckets over the eight 
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month trend period. However, when looking at a combination of those above the DTI 
cap, it appears to be insignificant when testing against the benchmark period. 
 Also, a trend that I notice is that typically, those with lower DTI ratios have a 
higher FICO Score than those with DTI ratios above 43 percent. This seems to make 
sense as the FICO Score accounts for amounts owed, such as leverage and utilization, and 
makes up 30 percent of the calculated score (myFICO). Since a higher DTI ratio shows 
that one may be overextending on their credit, this could be a result of a lower FICO 
Score. However, when looking at the DTI buckets of greater than 45 percent, there is an 
increase in the average FICO Score for that bucket compared to the rest of the buckets 
greater than the DTI cap. Typically, the GSEs don’t accept loans greater than 45 percent 
DTI, but there is an exception made for compensating factors that allow for these loans to 
be written by the GSEs (Fannie Mae, 2019). This is the reason for that increase in 
average FICO Score for the DTI Ratio, as one of the compensating factors required for 
when one’s DTI ratio is greater than 45 percent is a higher required FICO Score than 
those below 45 percent. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I examine the effects of the QM GSE Patch expiration on the GSE 
residential real estate market, specifically on the number of loans originated and weighted 
average home price. Using data from Recursion Co., which provides loan level data on 
all GSE loans, I’m able to calculate the number of loans originated and weighted average 
home price for the different time periods I’m measuring. The results I calculate show the 
differences between announcement dates of the QM Patch expiration and a five-year 
benchmark period from prior to the first announcement. I hypothesize that the mean 
36 
 
percent loan count change and mean percent weighted average home price change for 
loans above the DTI cap would increase at a higher rate than those below or at the cap as 
the GSEs try to push through more loans now before competition joins this non-QM 
market. There is an increase around these event periods as well as during the eight-month 
trend, but according to Student t-tests and difference in differences tests of announcement 
periods versus the five year benchmark, there does not appear to be statistically 
significant results that support my hypothesis.  
 My findings contribute new information to literature regarding the QM Patch, 
specifically the expiration of the patch in 2021. Most information prior to this paper is 
surrounding what a future without a QM Patch will look like, whereas this research 
shows the immediate impacts of what occurred after announcements of the expiration. 
These findings may be of interest to those interested in the effects of announcements of 
the QM Patch expiring in 2021, as well as those who are interested in how the QM Patch 
has impacted the number of loans the GSEs are obtaining and the change in home prices 
in the non-QM market versus the QM market. 
 Overall, this study highlights that the QM Patch has been associated with a rise in 
weighted average home price and the number of loans Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have 
originated or purchased, especially in the non-QM market. At the same time, we see that 
these increases during announcement periods are not significant compared against a five 
year, non-announcement, benchmark period.  
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